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ARTICLE III STANDING, THE SWORD AND THE SHIELD:




“In fashion, one day you are in, and the next day you are out.”1 Much like the
fashion industry, the contours of modern standing doctrine shift rapidly and, often
times, confusingly. Standing doctrine has been described as “a jumbled mess,”2
“mystifying,”3 and an “escape hatch.”4 Though convoluted it may be, the complexity
of standing doctrine illustrates above all its nature as nothing more than a construct
of the judiciary.
The law is complicated, and judges’ attempts to craft bright-line rules to inter-
pret and apply the law tend to muddle, rather than clarify, the purpose of the law in
question.5 So, too, with standing doctrine. The modern standing doctrine test has
been reduced to three “minimum” requirements,6 implying a hard-and-fast rule to
shield the judiciary from cases it might not wish to hear; however, tracing the
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2021; BA, University of Virginia, 2014.
Thank you to my mother, Suzanne, for her unwavering support, and to my father, Charles,
in whose memory this Note is dedicated.
1 This catchphrase, attributed to the host of Bravo’s fashion design reality television
show, Project Runway, references the quick, unpredictable shifts in the trend du jour of the
fashion industry. See Kate Aurthur, Another Catwalk for Fashion Series, N.Y.TIMES (Dec. 6,
2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/06/arts/another-catwalk-for-fashion-series.html
[https://perma.cc/S7KH-CABW].
2 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institu-
tionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1010 (2002).
3 Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 169, 170 (2012).
4 Eugene Kontorovich, Legal ‘Standing’: Obama’s Executive Branch Escape Hatch, L.A.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-kontorovich
-obamacare-legal-standing-20140302-story.html [https://perma.cc/3MZN-5FDY].
5 See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 991–96 (1995)
(noting several flaws with attempts to craft rules of law); see also John F. Duffy, Rules and
Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 614 (2009) (“[F]or
patentable subject matter . . . rules always fail.”). See generally Steven J. Mulroy, The Bright
Line’s Dark Side: Pre-Charge Attachment of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 92
WASH. L. REV. 213 (2017) (arguing against bright-line rules when considering pre-charge
Sixth Amendment right to counsel issues).
6 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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development of the modern doctrine reveals these minima as rather a sword for
litigants to address ahistorical wrongs.7 Framing standing doctrine as solely protec-
tion for the courts unnecessarily—and perhaps unconstitutionally—excludes individu-
als who have suffered abstract, but not generalized, wrongs from access to judicial
redress.8 Fortunately, when courts fabricate tests from whole cloth, those tests are
easily redesigned when the trend du jour turns to faux pas.
The recent proliferation of data breaches9 is one such event requiring a rethreading
of standing doctrine. The Courts of Appeal are currently split on whether to allow
or deny standing for data breach plaintiffs10—those persons seeking recourse from
the entities that fell victim to the breach and therein lost plaintiffs’ data to an unknown
third party. Standing requires plaintiffs to show some injury,11 and how courts ap-
proach the concept of injury in these data breach cases determines whether plaintiffs
will survive the standing analysis.12 Despite the disparate treatment of litigants
across the circuits, the Supreme Court has repeatedly punted when asked to resolve
the issue.13 Because of the grave importance of data breach plaintiffs’ lost and stolen
data,14 the Court must relinquish its standing shield and hand these litigants a sword
to pursue remedy.
Part I of this Note discusses the origin of the standing doctrine and its modern
articulation. Part II maps out the current condition of data breach litigation standing
7 See infra Section I.A.
8 See infra Section I.B.
9 See, e.g., Davey Winder, Data Breaches Expose 4.1 Billion Records in First Six Months
of 2019, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2019, 6:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019
/08/20/data-breaches-expose-41-billion-records-in-first-six-months-of-2019/#3da86375bd54
[https://perma.cc/SS3C-8T6W]; Herb Weisbaum, Data Breaches Happening at Record Pace,
Report Finds, NBC NEWS (July 24, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business
/consumer/data-breaches-happening-record-pace-report-finds-n785881 [https://perma.cc
/Z8NQ-XHH2].
10 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016).
11 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (establishing the three-part test: injury, nexus, and redres-
sability).
12 See Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing
in Data Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 695 (2017) (“Out of the three prongs of
Article III . . . plaintiffs most often falter on establishing injury . . . .”). But see Aaron
Wynhausen, Note, The Eighth Circuit Further Complicates Plaintiff Standing in Data Breach
Cases, 84 MO.L.REV. 297, 305–06 (2019) (noting that plaintiffs passing the injury threshold
then might stumble on the redressability prong).
13 See, e.g., Frank v. Gaos, 139 S. Ct. 1041 (2019) (remanding for briefing on standing
in light of the decision in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016)); In re Zappos.com,
Inc., 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1373 (2019); Attias v. CareFirst,
Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018).
14 See Weisbaum, supra note 9 (noting that modern hackers target Social Security numbers
and health records because they are worth significantly more on resale than credit card numbers).
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in the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal. Part III attempts to resolve the circuit
split by working through areas of agreement and open questions, arguing that a “breach
alone” may be tolerable to every circuit. Part IV recommends potential solutions to
the data breach standing issue, advancing a “tiered sensitivity” approach as the most
preferable. Part V outlines foundational frameworks on which to base the solutions
from both domestic and foreign jurisdictions and pleads for Court intervention
despite congressional inaction.
I. ARTICLE III & STANDING
A. The Court’s “Limits”
Constraints on the federal judiciary’s power to adjudicate cases are largely, if
not entirely, self-imposed limitations.15 As part of establishing a judicial branch coequal
to the executive and legislature, Article III of the Constitution provides two restric-
tions on the Court’s authority to hear judicial matters.16 First, federal courts may only
hear actual “cases” or “controversies” implicating U.S. laws or citizens.17 Second, aside
from the Court’s original jurisdiction, Congress may strip the Court of jurisdiction.18
Debate abounds as to the correct interpretation of both restrictions.19 But
ultimately, regardless of the many theories about the Court’s power, “It is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicia[ry] . . . to say what the law is.”20 Indeed,
as early as Marbury v. Madison, the Court recognized its own obligation to curb the
seemingly quite broad grant of discretionary constitutional power so as to balance
the federal tripartite.21 The Court has since developed a number of doctrines to limit
its own adjudicative scope.22
15 See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1004 (“The federal judiciary . . . invent[ed]
a whole series of doctrinal constraints that significantly reduce the scope of its potential au-
thority.”).
16 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
17 See id.; Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.
18 See U.S.CONST. art. III, § 2; The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—Leading Cases, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 135, 277 (1996).
19 See John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
and the Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 205–08 (1997) (summarizing several
arguments about the Cases or Controversies Clause); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term—
Leading Cases, supra note 18, at 277 (“For years, commentators have debated whether Con-
gress’s power . . . is as far-reaching as the text of the Exceptions Clause seems to suggest . . . .”).
20 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
21 See id. at 175–80 (refusing to issue writ of mandamus on jurisdictional grounds); Lee
& Ellis, supra note 3, at 185–86, 186 n.94 (noting Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792),
as an earlier example of self-limitation not tied to the Constitution).
22 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (abrogated on other grounds) (identify-
ing “standing . . . mootness, ripeness, [and] political question” as Article III doctrines that “relate
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Among these, standing doctrine addresses the Court’s aversion to hearing gen-
eralized grievances.23 Modern standing doctrine emerged in response to the expan-
sion of the administrative state in the early to mid-20th century.24 The precursor to
modern standing doctrine required litigants to identify an existing common law interest
to bring suit, rather than simply allege some harm.25 In effect, persons harmed by a
regulation were left without standing to challenge it unless that regulation interfered
with a recognized interest in the common law.26 In 1970, the Court abandoned fitting
a square peg into a round hole and allowed standing where litigants suffered an
Article III “injury in fact” and fell within a regulation’s “zone of interests.”27
To further entangle and manipulate the conception of standing, the Court also
developed prudential considerations which may, separately from the question of
constitutional standing, bar plaintiffs from bringing suit.28 The first articulation of
prudential standing came shortly after the Court’s shift toward the injury in fact stand-
ing requirement.29 In Warth v. Selden, the Court established the first two categories
of prudential standing: first, denying plaintiffs access to the courts for “generalized
grievance[s],” and second, disallowing plaintiffs to assert the rights of third parties.30
Approximately twenty years later, the Court pronounced the modern articulation
of constitutional standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, requiring an injury in
fact, causation, and the potential for redress by the adjudicating court.31 Conspicu-
ously, “zone of interests” is not mentioned in the Court’s Lujan opinion.32 But only
five years after Lujan, the Court confirmed the third category of prudential standing:
zone of interests.33
in . . . overlapping ways . . . about the constitutional and prudential limits” of the Court (quot-
ing Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178–79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring))).
23 See Lee & Ellis, supra note 3, at 183.
24 See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1009–10; Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the
Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1446 (1988) (“[The Court’s shift]
responded to a belief that the private-law model no longer worked in public-law cases.”).
25 See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1434–36.
26 See id. at 1434–35; see also Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1010 (“[T]his private
law model proved too unforgiving . . . .”).
27 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–53 (1970) (“The
question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the
question whether the interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”).
28 See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 2, at 1010–11.
29 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–501 (1975) (discussing the distinction between
Article III requirements and “prudential considerations”); Kylie Chiseul Kim, The Case Against
Prudential Standing: Examining the Courts’ Use of Prudential Standing Before and After
Lexmark, 85 TENN. L. REV. 303, 319–22 (2017).
30 See Kim, supra note 29, at 321–22 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499).
31 See 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
32 See generally id.
33 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (“Numbered among these prudential re-
quirements is the doctrine of . . . zone of interests . . . .”).
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The Court’s shift in utilization of the zone of interests doctrine is indicative of
the malleability of standing doctrine as a whole. Even better exemplified by the
Court’s recent elimination of the zone of interests doctrine altogether is Lexmark
International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.34 There, the Court explicitly
relegated the zone of interests inquiry to utilization in determining whether the
plaintiff has a cause of action, not standing.35 While leaving intact the original two
prudential considerations,36 Lexmark arguably signaled the Court’s willingness to
revisit issues of, at least, prudential standing, which may underscore a willingness
to rethink constitutional standing in certain contexts.
But the Court’s original shift in approach to standing—moving from identifiable
cause of action to identifiable injury—necessarily flipped the doctrine from a shield
for the judiciary into a sword for plaintiffs to redress nontraditional harms. In doing
so, the Court tipped its hand and reminded observers that standing is not only
malleable, but nothing more than an artifice of the Court’s own design. The Court
has continuously emphasized that fact in its maddeningly inconsistent treatment of
standing over the last half century.37 Faced with the square peg of defining harm in
a data breach, the Court should capitalize on the circuit split opportunity to adapt
standing doctrine into a sword for digital age litigants.
B. Articulating Modern Constitutional Standing Doctrine
Illustrative of the uncertainty inherent in the modern formulations of standing
doctrine, when pronouncing the zone of interests requirement in Ass’n of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,38 the Court failed to articulate the
contours of its application.39 The lower circuits struggled to reach consensus on the
issue, forcing the Court to later explain that the test merely guided courts when a
litigant challenged a regulation to which it is not directly subject.40 And during this
34 See 572 U.S. 118, 127 (2014) (“Although we admittedly have placed [the zone of
interests] test under the ‘prudential’ rubric in the past, it does not belong there . . . .”) (citation
omitted); Kim, supra note 29, at 335–36.
35 See Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 127–28; Kim, supra note 29, at 336.
36 See Kim, supra note 29, at 336–37 (noting Lexmark spoke only to zone of interests and
third-party rights considerations, leaving open the question of whether the latter should also
be stripped of its prudential label).
37 See generally supra notes 23–36 and accompanying text.
38 See 397 U.S. 150, 153–56 (1970).
39 See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162–63 (1997) (noting that the requirement
applied broadly after Data Processing and only later was affirmatively bounded); see also
Jonathan R. Siegel, Zone of Interests, 92 GEO. L.J. 317, 321 (2004).
40 See Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399–400 (1987); Siegel, supra note 39,
at 322–25. In effect, suggests Siegel, the Court considered the zone of interests requirement
a general prudential concern, not tied to a specific statute at issue. See id. at 328.
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time, the Court also added to the Article III injury in fact requirement,41 culminating
in the modern articulation provided in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.42
In Lujan, an environmental advocacy group brought suit against the Department
of the Interior (DOI).43 The plaintiffs sought reversal of a DOI rule that interpreted
a section of the Endangered Species Act as only applying, effectively, “within the
United States.”44 The plaintiffs claimed an injury through loss of habitat for endan-
gered species abroad, which would cause extinction of those species, and, therefore,
interested parties could no longer study or visit those species.45 The Court denied the
plaintiffs standing due to insufficient demonstration of an imminent injury.46
The modern doctrine infers from the language of Article III “irreducible consti-
tutional minimum” requirements to maintain a suit in federal court.47 To achieve
constitutional standing, a plaintiff must allege (1) an injury in fact; (2) a nexus between
the injury and some conduct by the defendant; and (3) redressability of the injury
through a favorable decision.48
1. Injury in Fact
The Court developed the injury in fact prong alongside the zone of interests re-
quirement in Data Processing simply as a means of shifting standing analysis away
from the traditional “legal interest” concept and toward recognition of any factual
harm—to expand, rather than curtail, the scope of recognized injuries for standing
purposes.49 Since Data Processing, however, the Court has chipped away at that
expansion to (presumably) ensure both that the judiciary remains constrained with
respect to its coequal branches and that the judicial system reserves its scant admin-
istrative bandwidth to adjudicate only the clearest cases of injury.50
41 Siegel, supra note 39, at 320.
42 See 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
43 Id. at 559.
44 Id. at 557–59.
45 Id. at 563–64.
46 Id. at 564.
47 Id. at 560.
48 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560–61).
49 See Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152–54 (1970); F.
Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275,
289–90, 295 (2008) (second alteration in original) (“[T]he Court intended to ‘expand [] the
types of “personal stake(s)” which are capable of conferring standing . . . .’” (quoting Linda
R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616–17 (1973))).
50 See Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2285, 2296–97 (2018); see also Hessick, supra note 49, at 300 (“So, why does current stand-
ing doctrine require injury in fact? The most likely reason is that it is firmly entrenched in
the law.”).
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But the Court continually justifies the rationale of injury in fact as a requirement
of Article III,51 despite Article III’s text demanding no such prerequisite to adjudica-
tion.52 The murkiness of the injury in fact prong precisely encapsulates why the
standing doctrine as a whole continually causes problems with persistently modern
issues like data breaches. Today, plaintiffs prove injury in fact by showing “‘an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual
or imminent . . . .’”53 But, put simply, the boundaries and meaning of the injury in
fact requirement remain vastly unsettled and open to revision despite repeated Court
attempts to clarify.
a. Actual or Imminent
The first injury in fact question asks whether a harm is “actual or imminent, not
‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”54 An actual injury, for the purpose of contrasting with
an imminent threat, need not be physical or visible, but simply the “invasion of a
legally protected interest.”55 Recently the Court reiterated its adherence to this principle,
quoting dicta from Lujan that describes the necessary injury as “not too speculative.”56
In other words, a “threatened injury must be certainly impending” to constitute Article
III standing and “[a]llegations of possible future injury” are insufficient.57
According to the Court, an imminent injury may rest on a chain of inferences
so long as that chain is sufficiently connective and not too attenuated.58 However, the
Court did not speak to what exactly constitutes too much attenuation.59 More recently,
the Court clarified that the concreteness requirement of injury in fact may be satisfied
by “risk of real harm,” which in turn suggests that the imminence requirement
should be subject to the same treatment—turning on the probability of injury rather
than the actuality (in time and space) of injury.60 But this point remains unsettled.
51 See Hessick, supra note 49, at 300.
52 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
53 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
54 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).
55 See id.; see also F. Andrew Hessick, Understanding Standing, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 195, 196 (2015).
56 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at
565 n.2).
57 Id. (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 158).
58 See id. at 414 & n.5 (noting the Court’s grant of standing for a “substantial risk” of future
injury and the potential of distinction between substantial risk and “certainly impending”
injury (citations omitted)).
59 See id. at 411–14 (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempted trace between threatened injury and
defendant’s conduct, but not pronouncing a test).
60 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“This does not mean, however,
that the risk of real harm cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness.”); see also Lee & Ellis,
supra note 3, at 179–80 (noting the Court’s vacillation on the subject and assuming arguendo
that the Court intends for imminence to involve both “temporality and probability”).
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b. Concrete and Particularized
In a recent decision, the Court distinguished that the second injury in fact question
operated as a conjunctive—that concreteness and particularization are separate
concepts, each of which much be satisfied to successfully survive analysis.61 To be
particular, an injury “must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”62
To be concrete, an “injury must be ‘de facto’”63—“‘real,’ and not ‘abstract.’”64
But a concrete injury need not be tangible.65 When an alleged harm is intangible,
the Court suggested that both historical common law claims and Congress’s wisdom
can inform, but not obligate, which of those harms will suffice for the standing
analysis.66 Thus, threat of future injury could be a concrete harm either by reference
to traditional claims or a federal statute.67 The Court further explained that violation
of a congressional procedural right alone may survive the injury in fact inquiry.68
But ultimately, the “last word” on concreteness rests with the judiciary, and, for
now, lower courts wrestle with that duty given the Court’s disheveled explanation
of tangibility.69
2. Nexus
The second prong of modern standing doctrine developed as a logically necessary
counterpart to the injury in fact requirement.70 If a litigant suffers a factual Article
III harm, that harm must come at the hands of some other person or entity, otherwise
a plaintiff must sue him- or herself. Thus, the Court pronounced that a plaintiff must
allege “a causal connection between the injury and [defendant’s] conduct” where the
harm is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and
61 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact,
but it is not sufficient. An injury in fact must also be concrete.”) (internal quotation omitted).
62 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)).
63 Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (9th ed. 2009)).
64 Id. (citing WEBSTER’STHIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 472 (1971); RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 305 (1967)).
65 Id. at 1549.
66 See id. (noting, as to the latter source, “Congress’ [sic] role in identifying and elevating
intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact require-
ment whenever a statute grants a [private right of action]”). But see Michael C. Dorf, Supreme
Court Requires “Concrete” Injury for Standing, VERDICT (May 18, 2016), https://verdict.jus
tia.com/2016/05/18/supreme-court-requires-concrete-injury-standing [https://perma.cc/H5BU
-4SJG] (arguing that the Court confused threshold standing with substantive liability by looking
to Congress’s historical recognition of injury).
67 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
68 See id.; Bayefsky, supra note 50, at 2304.
69 See Bayefsky, supra note 50, at 2304–05, 2308–09.
70 See Lee & Ellis, supra note 3, at 180.
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not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party . . . .”71 Similar
to the imminence analysis, the chain of causation may not be too attenuated or specula-
tive.72 Because standing in data breach litigation turns almost entirely on proving
injury in fact, this prong is discussed only in brief to provide context.
3. Redressability
Finally, a plaintiff must allege an injury for which it would be “‘likely,’ as op-
posed to merely ‘speculative,’” that a ruling for the plaintiff will redress the harm.73
Like the causation prong, the redressability prong is analyzed by reference to a chain
of speculation and inference.74 But the redressability prong is analytically distinct
from the causation prong: the latter focuses on what defendant did to cause the harm;
the former focuses on whether the requested relief will remedy the complained-of
harm.75 Redressability, like the nexus prong, is of little substantive value to analyze
data breach litigation standing, so this discussion merely provides context for a
holistic understanding of the Court’s modern standing doctrine formulation.
II. CURRENT STATE OF STANDING IN DATA BREACH LITIGATION
Data breaches are by nature difficult to actualize into a justiciable injury.76 Even
defining “data” poses a challenge given its likely infinite number of forms and
characterizations: vital (medical records), critical (Social Security numbers), finan-
cial (credit card numbers), etc.77 In a typical data breach situation, a third party gains
71 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (alteration in original) (quoting
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
72 See Lee & Ellis, supra note 3, at 180–82; see also id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part) (leaving open the possibility that the extent of the chain may be defined by Congress
(in addition to the courts)).
73 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
74 See Lee & Ellis, supra note 3, at 182–83 (briefly discussing three Supreme Court
decisions denying standing because redressability of the harm was too speculative).
75 See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 287 (2008) (“[T]o
demonstrate redressability, the plaintiff must show a ‘substantial likelihood that the requested
relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact . . . .’” (emphasis removed) (quoting Vt. Agency
of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000))).
76 See Max Melio, Note, Embracing Insecurity: Harm Reduction Through a No-Fault
Approach to Consumer Data Breach Litigation, 61 B.C.L.REV.1223,1229–31(2020)(“Fraudu-
lent charges are the most concrete identity theft harm, but a number of more abstract harms
have been noted as well. . . . There also may be new harms that materialize in the future.”).
77 One dictionary unhelpfully defines it as “information in digital form that can be trans-
mitted or processed.” Data, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/diction
ary/data [https://perma.cc/9KUE-AZJN] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). The federal government
broadly defines Personally Identifiable Information (PII)—which is often, but not always,
digital—as any “information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity,
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unauthorized access to a plaintiff’s data by infiltrating a system—controlled by a
defendant or another party—which a defendant uses to store that data.78
For the purposes of litigation, this situation poses a number of challenges, and
chief among them is how to define the plaintiff’s harm. Two recent Supreme Court
cases—Clapper v. Amnesty International USA79 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins80—form
the basis for articulating a data breach injury despite neither case concerning a data
breach in the “typical” sense (i.e., hackers penetrating digital infrastructure to obtain
the plaintiffs’ data). Unsurprisingly, the lower circuits developed a split when adapting
the Court’s “modern” standing articulation to these ultra-modern data breach situa-
tions. Some circuits contend that a threat of future identity theft suffices to form a
cognizable injury in fact,81 while others require some physical, tangible injury.82
A. Clapper & Spokeo
In Clapper, a group of plaintiffs comprising “attorneys and human rights, labor,
legal, and media organizations” alleged that a statute allowing potential surveillance
of their communications to clients outside of the United States, who “are likely targets
of surveillance under [the statute],” caused harm to the plaintiffs.83 The plaintiffs
claimed injury from the statute because, among other things, the plaintiffs forewent
telephone and email communications in favor of traveling to their clients’ locations
directly to circumvent the possibility of the U.S. government’s surveillance.84
The Court denied the plaintiffs standing to recover those costs because the harm
alleged by the plaintiffs was “not certainly impending.”85 Therefore, the Court’s dispo-
sition focused on the imminence of the future risk of harm.86 Because the plaintiffs’
fear of surveillance was not proven to be imminent, the actual costs the plaintiffs
either alone or when combined.” OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT,
PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO A BREACH OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFO. 8 (2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2017/m-17-12_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDL9-QDPA].
78 Luke Irwin, How Do Data Breaches Happen? Understanding Your Organisation’s
Biggest Threats, IT GOVERNANCE (June 26, 2019), https://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog
/understanding-the-different-types-of-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/FMQ9-433Y] (categoriz-
ing and describing seven types of data breaches).
79 568 U.S. 398 (2013).
80 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).
81 See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965–66 (7th Cir. 2016).
82 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768–70 (8th Cir. 2017).
83 See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 406–07.
84 See id. at 407 (“In addition, [plaintiffs] declare that they have undertaken ‘costly and
burdensome measures’ to protect the confidentiality of sensitive communications.” (citation
omitted)).
85 See id. at 416.
86 Id. (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing by inflicting harm on themselves based
on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” (emphasis added)).
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incurred to mitigate those fears were also non-imminent.87 But the Court only held
that the fear of a future harm must be nonspeculative; it did not foreclose that risk
as insufficient to survive the imminence analysis.88
The defendant in Spokeo ran a digital “people search engine.”89 Given “a per-
son’s name, a phone number, or an e-mail address,” the defendant’s website crawled
online databases to generate an information package about that person.90 The plaintiff
alleged that when the defendant’s website compiled information about the plaintiff, all
of the information the website returned was wrong, which constituted a “willful[]
fail[ure] to comply with [a federal statute’s] requirements.”91
The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further inquiry into whether
the plaintiff adequately alleged both a particularized and concrete injury, given that,
according to the Court, the Ninth Circuit inappropriately conflated the two concepts and
failed to properly analyze the concreteness prong of injury in fact.92 The Court took
measured care to note that “a bare procedural violation,” without more, cannot survive
the concreteness analysis.93 But the Court also deliberately emphasized that a risk
of future harm remains viable in the standing analysis despite its intangibility.94
B. The Circuit Split
1. Expansive Theories
The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted plaintiff-friendly
standing theories regarding injury in data breach litigation.95 Generally, these courts
87 See id. at 422.
88 See id. at 416–18.
89 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1544 (2016).
90 See id.
91 Id. at 1546.
92 See id. at 1548, 1550.
93 See id. at 1550 (noting that the defendant’s website reporting “an incorrect zip code”
posed little risk of actual harm). But see Dorf, supra note 66 (challenging the Court’s mini-
mization of the incorrect zip code by posing a hypothetical: if a potential employer mailed an
employment solicitation to the zip code as reported, would plaintiff not have lost out on an
employment opportunity?).
94 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“This does not mean, however, that the risk of real harm
cannot satisfy the requirement of concreteness.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
U.S. 398 (2013))).
95 See generally In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139
S. Ct. 1373 (2019); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 981 (2018); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert
v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016). It should be noted here that
the Third Circuit has also granted standing to data breach litigants who brought suit under a
federal statute. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 641
(3d Cir. 2017) (“Our precedent and congressional action lead us to conclude that the improper
disclosure of one’s personal data in violation of [a federal statute] is a cognizable injury for
Article III standing purposes.”). However, the court’s analysis is grounded in congressional
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agree that a heightened risk of identity theft following a data breach is sufficient for
the purposes of Article III.96 In each case, a third party hacked into a defendant’s
electronic system and stole the plaintiffs’ personal data.97
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc. is illus-
trative of the rationale employed in sister circuits.98 In 2014, the defendant restaurant
issued a public announcement that hackers had gained access to customer financial
information.99 When the plaintiffs learned of the breach and their potential exposure,
they spent time, effort, and money to monitor their credit statements for identity
theft and debit card accounts for fraudulent charges, and subsequently filed suit to
recoup these losses.100
In granting standing to these plaintiffs, the court recognized that once a data breach
has occurred and data is stolen, the risk of future harm from that loss is “concrete
enough to support a lawsuit.”101 The court acknowledged that even without hackers
utilizing the stolen data, the plaintiffs’ time and effort spent mitigating potential
losses are sufficient to support Article III standing.102 Further expanding the reach
of the plaintiffs’ sword, the court noted that the reasonability of mitigation efforts
is a question of merit, not standing.103
While Lewert illustrates the general approach of the expansive circuits, it is worth
highlighting the D.C. Circuit’s two-part “increased-risk-of-harm” test to emphasize
the meaning of a substantial risk of future harm.104 In 2014, the defendant health
insurer fell victim to hackers who stole insureds’ personal information, allegedly
including names, birthdays, credit card numbers, Social Security numbers, and other
health and sensitive information.105 Reviewing the lower court’s dismissal for lack of
sufficiently alleged injury, the court applied a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the
“ultimate alleged harm” would be “concrete and particularized” and then (2) “whether
the increased risk of such harm makes injury . . . sufficiently ‘imminent.’”106
ability to grant standing through statute; therefore, this reasoning is analyzed infra in Section
V.B. See id. at 635, 639–40.
96 See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, 888 F.3d at 1029; see also Attias, 865 F.3d at 627–29;
Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388–89; Lewert, 819 F.3d at 966–67.
97 In re Zappos.com, 888 F.3d at 1023; Attias, 865 F.3d at 622; Galaria, 663 F. App’x
at 386; Lewert, 819 F.3d at 965.
98 See generally Lewert, 819 F.3d 963.
99 Id. at 965.
100 See id.
101 Id. at 967.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627–29 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 981 (2018).
105 Id. at 622–23, 628.
106 Id. at 627 (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir.
2015)).
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Because the plaintiffs alleged identity theft as the ultimate injury, which “[n]obody
doubt[ed] . . . would constitute a concrete and particularized injury,” the court turned
to analysis of whether the defendants, through their alleged negligence, caused the
plaintiffs a “substantial risk of identity theft.”107 The court found such a substantial risk
through the plaintiffs’ allegations of either financial fraud or healthcare fraud.108 First,
the exposure of Social Security numbers and credit card numbers alone constituted suf-
ficient injury in fact with respect to financial fraud.109 Second, and perhaps more in-
teresting, the court found that the loss of personal information, as a combination of
data, was sufficiently pled as to risk “medical identity theft.”110 In granting standing
for either set of allegations, the court concluded that “a substantial risk of harm exists
already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs
allege was taken.”111
2. Narrow Theories
By contrast, the First, Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have generally denied
standing to data breach plaintiffs based on a future harm theory.112 These circuits
agree that the risk of potential injury is too speculative to survive an Article III
analysis.113 Part III of this Note examines the specific distinguishing characteristics
of each of the leading cases in narrow jurisdictions.114 But the Eighth Circuit’s
analysis in In re SuperValu illustrates the rationale underlying courts’ choices to block
standing for plaintiffs in data breach litigation actions.115
In 2014, the defendant supermarket announced that hackers had infiltrated its com-
puter system and had gained access to stored customer financial information.116 The
107 Id.
108 See id. at 628.
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 Id. at 629.
112 See generally In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels
Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017);
Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012). It must be noted here that prior to the
Court’s opinion in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), the Third Circuit fell into this
analysis pool. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41–42 (3d Cir. 2011). Post-Spokeo,
the Third Circuit may still retain its restrictive theory of standing for state law claims. Accord
Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, and a
Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 91 (2017).
113 See In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 767, 770–72; Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90 (holding that
the plaintiffs’ canceled credit card and lack of additional lost personal information foreclosed
risk of future injury); Beck, 848 F.3d at 275–76 (holding that a thirty-three percent chance
of identity theft fell short of a “‘substantial risk’ of harm”); Katz, 672 F.3d at 80 (holding that
the risk of future harm was insufficient to give the plaintiff standing without an actual un-
authorized access).
114 See infra Part III.
115 See generally In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d 763.
116 Id. at 766.
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plaintiffs alleged both that they were exposed to a future risk of identity theft and
that they had spent time and effort ensuring their potentially compromised information
was not used to make fraudulent charges.117 Despite acknowledging that third-party
criminals did indeed steal the plaintiffs’ financial data, the court declined standing
to plaintiffs who had not alleged actual misuse of that data.118 Because only the
plaintiffs’ financial data, and no “personally identifying information, such as social
security numbers, birth dates, or driver’s license numbers” were stolen, the plaintiffs
could not—by their own evidence119—establish a substantial risk of future financial
fraud.120 Therefore, because the risk of future fraud theory was not “personal and
individual” to these plaintiffs121—that they only established that a breach could result
in fraud, not that they were at risk—time and effort spent to curtail the potential
injury was unreasonable in response to the unsubstantiated threat.122
Both the Eighth and Second Circuit decisions tend to show the narrow-theory
courts’ unwillingness to find a credible risk of injury where hackers do not have the
ability to utilize the data that was stolen.123 The Fourth and First Circuits similarly failed
to find a future harm injury without evidence of a data breach by theft, implying that
a risk of identity theft or fraud is only feasible when a third party retrieves the data with
ill-will and the intent to use it.124 All narrow circuits therefore found a risk of future
harm injury theory too speculative on the facts presented, but none of the circuits
actually foreclosed risk of future harm as a valid Article III injury for data breach
cases. Rather, the courts leave open the possibility that proper contextualization might
sufficiently lower the courts’ shield against suits involving generalized injuries—
that a risk of future harm is never too speculative in data breach situations.
117 Id. at 766–67.
118 Id. at 769–70.
119 Id. at 770–71 (“As the [Government Accountability Office (GAO)] report points out,
compromised credit or debit card information . . . ‘generally cannot be used alone to open un-
authorized new accounts.’ . . . [Also], the findings of the GAO report do not plausibly support
the contention that consumers affected by a data breach face a substantial risk of credit or debit
card fraud.” (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMA-
TION: DATA BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS
LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 30 (June 2007), https://www.gao.gov
/assets/270/262899.pdf)).
120 See id. (citing Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276 (4th Cir. 2017)).
121 See id. at 770 (citing and quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016)).
122 See id. at 771; cf. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013).
123 See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017); In re SuperValu,
870 F.3d at 771 (explaining the inadequacy of the government report which stated there was
minimal chance of fraud following a breach and there existed a lack of long-term study results
to prove otherwise); see also Wynhausen, supra note 12, at 316 (“[The Eighth Circuit] effec-
tively shut the door on any recovery for plaintiffs unless they can prove actual identity theft.”).
124 See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (remarking that no evidence had yet surfaced that a stolen
laptop’s contents had been accessed or misused or that a thief intended to steal plaintiffs’ in-
formation when taking the device); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012)
(denying plaintiff’s risk of harm injury theory because there had yet been no breach).
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III. STITCHING TOGETHER THE SPLIT CIRCUIT
Although the Courts of Appeal appear to have a binary divide between granting
and denying Article III standing to data breach victims, upon closer examination, the
circuit split is much more nuanced and potentially not a true split after all. For example,
despite rulings on opposite sides of the “heightened risk” question, the circuits tend
to agree that for instances of actual fraud or identity theft, costs borne to mitigate or
prevent the effects of fraud and identity theft are actionable against defendants who
have exposed the compromised data.125 Further still, it is generally suggested that
certain data types (e.g., financial information, critical records, and health histories),
especially in combination with one another, tend to require a looser interpretation
of standing to allow victimized plaintiffs an opportunity to recover.126
But in every case, the court seems to either allow or leaves open the question
whether the data breach alone gives rise to the concrete, particularized, imminent
injury required by Article III.127 In the expansive theory jurisdictions, this notion is
rather plain. The Seventh Circuit, for example, noted that once data has been stolen,
“[i]t is plausible to infer a substantial risk of harm from the data breach, because a
primary incentive for hackers is ‘sooner or later[] to make fraudulent charges or
assume those consumers’ identities[.]’”128
It follows from this reasoning that a future risk injury is intertwined with the data
breach event. Put another way, when a hacker invades a digital system which stores
sensitive data (or a garden variety thief steals an analogous physical device), that event
is a data breach and it creates a liability for the party hosting that data because, “Why
else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private informa-
tion?”129 Narrow theory jurisdictions tend to require plaintiffs to prove that thieves have
put the figurative pen to paper, but these courts fail to appreciate “that an individual
whose personally identifying information has been stolen and is subsequently in the
hands of thieves or skilled hackers is far more at risk than someone whose data is still
secure.”130 It is a fundamental misunderstanding in the narrow theory jurisdictions
125 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 770 (“Nobody doubts that identity theft, should
it befall one of these plaintiffs, would constitute a concrete and particularized injury.”
(quoting Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 981 (2018))); see also Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir.
2016) (finding that although fraudulent charges were not borne by the plaintiffs, other mitigation
costs such as time spent monitoring and reviewing were sufficient injuries); Whalen, 689 F.
App’x at 91 n.1 (contrasting the instant action with Lewert, suggesting that the instant plaintiff
failed where the Lewert plaintiffs might have succeeded in the Second Circuit).
126 See, e.g., Attias, 865 F.3d at 628; Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91.
127 See supra Section II.B.
128 Lewert, 819 F.3d at 967 (alteration in original) (quoting Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015)).
129 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.
130 Kimberly Fasking, Comment, Beck v. McDonald: The Waiting Game—Is an Increased
Risk of Future Identity Theft an Injury-in-Fact for Article III Standing?, 41 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 387, 402 (2017).
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that loss of consumer data is not an injury to the consumer. Fortunately, these courts
have not entirely foreclosed that these data breach victims are without recourse—
rather, each circuit’s jurisprudence tends to show the courts’ willingness to grant
standing to these plaintiffs if their risk of future harm is properly contextualized.131
Therefore, a simple circuit split solution follows: a data breach alone is sufficient
to survive the injury in fact analysis. The expansive theory jurisdictions, in addition
to the Seventh Circuit, provide support for this approach.132 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
goes further than the D.C. and Sixth Circuits by explicitly rejecting defendants’ claims
that a threat of identity fraud was no longer imminent at the time of litigation.133 In
doing so, the necessary implication is that once data has been stolen, the threat to
victims is permanent.134 Therefore, plaintiffs should achieve, and continually possess,
standing in actions against data breach defendants from the moment of the breach
onward. Though other standing frameworks may be foreclosed in narrow jurisdictions,
the following analysis supports that each circuit’s approach is readily compatible
with the “breach alone” concept.
A. First Circuit
The First Circuit adjudicated its most recent data breach litigation case in
2012.135 Because Katz was decided pre-Clapper, even considering the court’s then-
narrow approach, the question of whether a data breach alone may satisfy the court’s
standing requirements bears less scrutiny than in sister circuits. In this case, the
plaintiff alleged that her sensitive information was improperly stored by defendant
and left unprotected from potential unauthorized access.136 The plaintiff did not
allege any actual theft of the data; therefore, the court found no standing to sue for
the threat of theft.137 But the court itself distinguished its ruling from cases where
131 See infra notes 132–59 and accompanying text.
132 See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 981 (2018) (“[A]n unauthorized party has already accessed [the] data . . . and it
is much less speculative . . . to infer that this party has both the intent and the ability to use
that data for ill.”); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir.
2016) (“There is no need for speculation where [p]laintiffs allege that their data has already
been stolen and is now in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals.”).
133 See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S.
Ct. 1373 (2019).
134 See Adam Shell, Equifax Data Breach Could Create Lifelong Identity Theft Threat,
USATODAY (Sept. 9, 2017, 10:08 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/09/09
/equifax-data-breach-could-create-life-long-identity-theft-threat/646765001/ [https://perma.cc
/62WG-TYLN].
135 See generally Katz v. Pershing, L.L.C., 672 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2012).
136 See id. at 70.
137 See id. at 79.
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data is “actually . . . accessed by one or more unauthorized third parties.”138 By its
own language, First Circuit jurisprudence appears to neatly settle within a breach
alone approach.
B. Second Circuit
In Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., the Second Circuit declined standing to a
litigant who was not only impacted by a data breach, but also fell victim to attempted
fraudulent purchases through the stolen data.139 Because the plaintiff had promptly
cancelled her credit card after the fraudulent purchases, the court did not accept the
plaintiff’s theory of future risk of harm.140 The court further implied that had the
breach included additional sensitive information, the threat of identity fraud would
present a stronger argument.141
The court’s rationale relies on a fundamental misunderstanding of modern identity
theft tactics.142 Potential thieves need as little as one piece of information to success-
fully steal a victim’s identity.143 Even an exposed credit card number might reveal
enough information to continue an identity theft scheme long after the cardholder
cancels the card.144 The court cited both Sixth and Seventh Circuit opinions to contrast
the Whalen plaintiff’s insufficiency with, plausibly, cases it presumes are correctly
decided.145 With proper framing regarding the reach of identity theft, the Second
Circuit may likely reverse course and adopt the breach alone approach.146
138 See id. at 80.
139 689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). 
140 Id.
141 Id. at 90–91.
142 See id. It is also of import that the Whalen opinion was issued as a summary order and
is limited in both its analysis and its reliance on case law. The Second Circuit has yet to render
a precedential opinion discussing data breach litigants’ standing.
143 See Lisa Rogak, 10 Things You Should Know About Identity Theft, CREDITCARDS.COM,
https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/help/10-things-you-should-know-about-iden
tity-theft-6000/ [https://perma.cc/5QQD-78RM] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (discussing how
even nonfinancial personal information, such as email login credentials or a telephone number,
can be enough for a thief to steal someone’s identity). See generally Will Kenton, Social
Engineering, INVESTOPEDIA (May 10, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-en
gineering.asp [https://perma.cc/64CZ-PATM] (describing a common method of accessing
sensitive pieces of information to fraudulently create an identity package of another person).
144 See Rogak, supra note 143, § 10 (noting that major credit bureaus provide free credit
monitoring for up to ninety days, contradicting the Whalen court’s assertion that identity fraud
threats cease upon card termination).
145 See Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90 (citing Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F.
App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016)); id. at 91 n.1 (citing Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc.,
819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., L.L.C., 794 F.3d 688 (7th
Cir. 2015)).
146 But see Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90. The court rejected one of the plaintiff’s harm theories
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C. Fourth Circuit
In 2013, a laptop containing sensitive healthcare data was determined to have
been stolen from a hospital.147 The Fourth Circuit denied standing to affected patients
who sued on a risk of health identity theft theory.148 The court specifically distin-
guished this theory as presented from Seventh Circuit precedent based on the Beck
plaintiffs’ failure to allege that an unauthorized third party sought out the laptop to
infiltrate it for the purpose of stealing the sensitive data.149 The court also noted that
the missing laptop was never found, and the plaintiffs could not show that the sensitive
data was ever accessed.150 Despite defendant’s own investigation concluding that the
laptop had been stolen,151 the court concluded that the chain of attenuation between
theft and the alleged potential harm was too speculative post-Clapper.152
Further, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that they also suffered a sub-
stantially increased risk of future harm.153 Though the plaintiffs had provided evidence
“that 33% of those affected by [defendant’s] data breaches will become victims of
identity theft,”154 the court declined to find this increased risk—presumably from zero
risk to a one-in-three chance—substantial.155 But like the Second Circuit in Whalen,
the Fourth Circuit relied on an incomplete understanding of the gravity of lost or
stolen data.156 Due to certain data’s critical—and potentially perpetual157—nature,
based on actual fraudulent purchases with the stolen data, because although fraudulent purchases
were attempted, the plaintiff was never required to pay for them. Id.
147 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017).
148 Id. at 274.
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 Id. at 275.
152 See id. (noting that the plaintiffs’ arguments relied on thieves both targeting the laptop
to steal identities and then choosing the named plaintiffs to defraud—neither of which were
alleged or proven).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 276.
155 See id. In footnote, the court also discarded the plaintiffs’ allegation that “data-breach
victims are 9.5 times more likely than the average person to suffer identity theft” because that
statistic spoke to breaches generally rather than to the litigated breach. See id. at 275 n.7.
156 See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
157 For example, state law requires retention of medical records by medical doctors and
hospitals for various lengths of time, but generally for five to ten years following the patient’s
last treatment or visit. See Kristina Ericksen, How Long Are Medical Records Kept? And 9
Other Health History FAQs, RASMUSSEN COLL. (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.rasmussen
.edu/degrees/health-sciences/blog/how-long-are-medical-records-kept/ [https://perma.cc/YE8Z
-E96S]; see also Joy Pritts et al., Privacy and Security Solutions for Interoperable Health
Information Exchange: Report on State Medical Record Access Laws, AGENCY FOR HEALTH-
CARE RSCH. & QUALITY, Appx. A-7 (Aug. 2009) (surveying state medical record retention
requirements for hospitals and doctors); cf. MASS.GEN.LAWS ch. 111, § 70 (2008) (requiring
a twenty-year holding period for medical records). But do these laws apply to technology
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risk of identity theft can be ever-present.158 Given adequate contextualization and
fact-framing, courts like the Fourth Circuit may be more willing to ease their appre-
hensions about abstract theories of harm.159 Like the Eighth Circuit, it appears that
evidentiary quality would be a tipping point towards granting standing should the
Fourth Circuit be confronted with the “breach alone” theory.160
D. Eighth Circuit
The essential facts of SuperValu are discussed supra in Section II.B.2. Although
the Eighth Circuit denied these plaintiffs standing based on a risk of future harm
theory, the court also noted that the insufficiency of the evidence proffered to
support the theory was the fatal flaw in the allegation.161 The plaintiffs’ reliance on
a then decade-old federal report failed to adequately support their argument that data
breaches often result in identity theft to victims.162 Because the plaintiffs’ evidence
did not show that their stolen financial data would (by itself) likely be used fraudu-
lently, plaintiffs could not prove a substantial risk of future harm.163
companies like Google, with whom healthcare providers share patient information? See Natasha
Singer & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google to Store and Analyze Millions of Health Records,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/business/google-ascen
sion-health-data.html [https://perma.cc/ZG92-TKNC]. If not, patient health records—and a
risk of identity theft—may exist for many decades—as long as Google’s servers keep running.
158 See Sid Kirchheimer, Protecting the Dead from Identity Theft, AARP BULL., https://
www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-03-2013/protecting-the-dead-from-identity-theft.html
[https://perma.cc/7UBE-ULCB] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021) (discussing how even the deceased
can be targets of identity theft).
159 For healthcare data breaches especially, the risk of “general” identity theft appears to
be much more substantial than the Beck plaintiffs alleged with respect to health identity theft.
See Jessica Davis, 70% of Data Involved in Healthcare Breaches Increases Risk of Fraud,
HEALTHITSECURITY (Sept. 25, 2019), https://healthitsecurity.com/news/70-of-data-involved
-in-healthcare-breaches-increases-risk-of-fraud [https://perma.cc/XC67-JZMK] (noting a recent
study that found 150 million patients’ “Social Security numbers, dates of birth, [and/or] driver’s
licenses [sic] numbers” were exposed in 194 healthcare data breaches); cf. Steven Bearak, Opin-
ion, Medical Identity Theft on the Rise—5 Tips to Protect Your Employees and Clients, SC
MEDIA (May 23, 2017), https://www.scmagazine.com/home/opinion/executive-insight/medi
cal-identity-theft-on-the-rise-5-tips-to-protect-your-employees-and-clients/ [https://perma.cc
/5DHV-B7F5] (noting that “medical identities are 20 to 50 times more valuable to criminals
than financial identities”).
160 See supra Section II.B.2; infra Section III.D.
161 See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771 (8th Cir. 2017) (“It is possible that some
years later there may be more detailed factual support for plaintiffs’ allegations of future
injury. But such support is absent from the complaint here . . . .”).
162 Id. (“The 2007 [GAO Report] found that ‘[c]omprehensive information on the out-
comes of data breaches is not available,’ and the ‘extent to which data breaches result in
identity theft is not well known[.]’” (citations omitted)).
163 See id. at 770–71.
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However, in footnote, the court recognized without “comment[ing] on the suffi-
ciency,” that the plaintiffs likely had other avenues to prove a risk of future harm
theory.164 The court also specifically noted that the plaintiffs failed to advance a
“breach alone”–style argument on appeal.165 Simply put, the Eighth Circuit did not
actually foreclose the “breach alone” approach, and might likely adopt it given ade-
quate evidentiary support.
IV. PROPOSED DATA BREACH STANDING FRAMEWORKS
A. Unpacking the “Breach Alone” Approach
The preceding circuit split analysis focused on identifying a clear, plausible thread
of continuity among all of the circuits to establish that data breach litigants should
ideally enjoy Article III standing perpetually beginning at the moment of breach.166
The “breach alone” approach simply asks whether a data breach has occurred. If so,
a litigant successfully proves an injury in fact. However, it is not difficult to recog-
nize that the “breach alone” analytical framework is not necessarily a clean solution
for data breach litigants. Indeed, if the amici curiae briefs filed by the technology
giants in Spokeo are any indication, corporations against whom liability would be
imposed in data breach suits may be, logically, vigorously opposed to allowing liti-
gants standing to sue in any situation.167
164 Id. at 771 n.5.
165 See id. (noting that the district court discussed whether the data breach constituted a cog-
nizable “invasion of privacy” and that the “plaintiffs [did] not press [the argument] on appeal”).
166 See supra Part III.
167 See, e.g., Brief for Experian Information Solutions, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 8, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339) (“Indeed this very
case is an example of a class action concerning no concrete harm.”); see also Brief for Amici
Curiae eBay Inc., Facebook, Inc., Google Inc., and Yahoo! Inc. in Support of Petitioner at 1–7,
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (No. 13-1339) [hereinafter Facebook Amicus].
See generally David J. Baldwin, Jennifer Penberthy Buckley & Ryan Slaugh, Insuring Against
Privacy Claims Following a Data Breach, 122 PENN STATE L. REV. 683 (2018) (identifying
commonly litigated issues in data breach trials and options for companies to protect against po-
tential liability). Some major corporations have recently jumped onto the consumer data privacy
bandwagon. See, e.g., YouTube Commercials, Privacy on iPhone—Simple as That—Apple,
YOUTUBE (July 28, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHcf9ZkJ28o (“Right now,
there is more private information on your phone than in your home. Think about that—so many
details about your life, right in your pocket. This makes privacy more important now than ever.
Your location, your messages, your heartrate after a run—these are private things—personal
things. And they should belong to you. Simple as that.” (emphasis added)). It is unclear whether
these corporations would also advocate to grant standing to data breach plaintiffs, their push
for consumer data privacy notwithstanding. Compare Facebook Amicus (filed with the Court
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If a breach occurs and a victim has not yet suffered an identity fraud, has no ex-
penses related to, for example, credit monitoring, or related costs have already been
reimbursed by the breached entity, what damages can a court reasonably assess?168 It
is true that damages in future risk of harm cases are necessarily somewhat impre-
cise;169 however, an imprecise damages calculation does not translate to zero liability.
Plaintiffs need not prove a dollar amount of damages to secure a favorable judg-
ment.170 Further, the “breach alone” approach relates specifically to the injury in fact
prong of Article III standing analysis—redressability is an interrelated but separate
issue. Data breach litigants’ path forward after proving an injury in fact is beyond
the scope of this Note.
Another potential criticism is the question of who is truly responsible for a data
breach. Which entity or individual should litigants target for recovery in data breach
actions?171 For example, when data resides in the cloud, there are at least three
vulnerability points which hackers could target: (1) the customers (the typical data
breach suit plaintiffs); (2) the data owners (the typical defendant in these actions
[e.g., CareFirst, Michaels Stores, etc.]); and (3) the data holders (the entity running
the data-hosting servers [e.g., Amazon Web Services]).172 If hackers infiltrate a
security system and steal identifying customer data, should those users who are now
in 2014), with Julia Carrie Wong, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Announces Privacy Overhaul: ‘We
Don’t Have the Strongest Reputation,’ GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2019, 3:52 PM), https://www
.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/30/facebook-f8-conference-privacy-mark-zuckerberg
[https://perma.cc/E8UJ-FJYA] (reporting that the founder of Facebook intended to gear the site
towards becoming a “privacy-focused social platform”).
168 See Dowty, supra note 12, at 702–04.
169 Id. at 702 (“[C]ourts first have to speculate as to whether theft or fraud might happen,
and then, speculating that it will happen, speculate further as to what potential damages
might result.”).
170 See Eric S. Boos, Chandler Givens & Nick Larry, Damages Theories in Data Breach
Litigation, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 125, 146–47 (2015) (noting that under privacy statutes,
plaintiffs need not prove financial harm); Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked,
and Now You’re Being Sued: The Developing World of Cybersecurity Litigation, 90 FLA.
BAR J. 30, July–Aug. 2016, at 35 (noting a successful use of data breach litigants’ unjust
enrichment theory).
171 See Who Is Liable When a Data Breach Occurs?, THOMSON REUTERS: LEGAL, https://
legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/insights/articles/data-breach-liability [https://perma.cc/AY2A-5257]
(last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
172 Id. Note that the second and third types of vulnerability points can coincide when the
owner of the data hosts its own server system like Google. See generally Data and Security,
GOOGLE DATA CTRS., https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/data-security/ [https://
perma.cc/6M6Q-UBXE] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021). In its Privacy and Security Compliance
FAQ, Google states, “Your data [is] stored in Google’s network of data centers.” Compliance,
GOOGLE CLOUD HELP, https://support.google.com/googlecloud/answer/6056694 [https://
perma.cc/EDD6-L6FZ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
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susceptible to identity theft seek recovery from the data owner or the data host?173—
both?174—neither?175 However, the appropriate question for the injury in fact inquiry
is “was there harm,” not “who caused the harm.” Therefore, the investigation into
the ultimately responsible party is better suited to the nexus prong of the constitu-
tional standing analysis, not the injury in fact prong, and is correspondingly also
outside the scope of this Note.
Despite properly allocating some potential criticisms to the appropriate portions
of Article III standing analysis, the “breach alone” framework is perhaps too heavy
of a sword for data breach plaintiffs to wield. In effect, any data breach would trigger
strict liability on the part of a data owner or host, which simply has the potential to go
too far.176 “Big data” has some positive social benefits,177 and imposing presumably
173 See generally Data Breach Response: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(May 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0154_data
-breach-response-guide-for-business-042519-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH8J-JZS6]. The Federal
Trade Commission suggests that the onus is on the data owner to ensure a data host operates
with good security practices, see id. at 3, but in the event of a breach, data hosts are likely re-
quired to notify the data owners, id. at 6, implying potential ultimate liability. Of course, data
owners also might owe notice to consumers. See id. at 6–9.
174 See Edward J. McAndrew, Surviving the Service Provider Data Breach, DLA PIPER
(July 29, 2019), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2019/07/surviving-the
-service-provider-data-breach/ [https://perma.cc/X7VR-ALN5] (“Covered entities and their
service providers are ending up as co-defendants in data breach class action litigation,” where,
analogous to terms used here, a covered entity is equivalent to a data owner and a service pro-
vider is equivalent to a data host.).
175 See Kayla Matthews, Who’s Financially Responsible for Cybersecurity Breaches?,
SEC.BOULEVARD (Sept. 17, 2019), https://securityboulevard.com/2019/09/whos-financially
-responsible-for-cybersecurity-breaches/ [https://perma.cc/99CQ-CCQB] (noting existing
argument that customers “vote with their wallets” to support only companies with the best
consumer protections).
176 See Seth D. Rothman & Dennis S. Klein, Defending a Data Breach Class Action, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, June 6, 2016, at 4, 4 (highlighting the recent trend of “data breach[] . . .
litigation” and surveying certain “high-profile settlements” as viable, if not preferable options
to trial); cf. Facebook Amicus, supra note 167, at 12–15 (arguing that standing must protect
defendants from the threat of litigation based on statutory procedural violations). But see,
e.g., Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 627 (2018) (drawing on the common law
development of products liability to sketch a framework for a data breach-specific tort);
Colin J.A. Oldberg, Note, Organizational Doxing: Disaster on the Doorstep, 15 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 181, 199–205 (2016) (advancing strict liability as the preferable framework in
data breach cases involving hacking and doxing because it would force entities to “beef up
security, or risk going out of business”).
177 Daniel Riedel, The Duality of Big Data: The Angel and the Demon, WIRED (Oct. 2014),
https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/10/duality-big-data/ [https://perma.cc/P7ZJ-E69D] (dis-
cussing how “big data” is utilized to provide services that help improve societies in areas such
as healthcare and environmentalism).
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large fines and judgments on data owners (and holders) for these data breaches may
net negative if the entities are forced out of business.178 Therefore, two slightly nar-
rower alternative solutions are proposed in addition to the broadest “breach alone”
framework to mitigate concerns of overreach. This Note ultimately recommends that
the Court adopts the latter approach to achieve the proper balance of Article III
sword and shield.
B. “Piggybacking” Approach
Similar to the class action device,179 the “piggybacking” approach would utilize
the injury to one plaintiff to establish sufficient injury for another plaintiff.180 However,
“piggybacking” would act like a reverse class device. Where named plaintiffs of a
class action cannot draw on harms to other unnamed plaintiffs to establish injury in
fact,181 “piggybacking” would utilize the Article III–sufficient injury of an unnamed
data breach victim to establish an imminent, concrete, particularized risk of future
harm for the instant, named data breach plaintiff.182
Although practically the narrowest of the three advanced proposals, “piggyback-
ing” would require perhaps the most radical overhaul of the Court’s prudential standing
doctrine. This approach would borrow significantly from the concept of jus tertii: “third
party rights.”183 Under modern jurisprudence, as a means of prudential self-limitation,
the Court has in place a generalized bar on litigants asserting the rights of a third
178 Cf. David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine
in the Payment Card Industry, 75MD.L.REV.935,980–82 (2016) (arguing that negligence stan-
dards appropriately weigh economic benefits of credit card systems against transaction costs).
179 7A CHARLESALAN WRIGHT&ARTHURR.MILLER,FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1751 (3d ed. 2020) (“[T]he class action [is] a procedural device for resolving disputes af-
fecting numerous people.”).
180 See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017) (“A putative class action
can proceed as long as one named plaintiff has standing.”). The underlying procedural mechanics
of establishing a class are not helpful to expand on “piggybacking”; therefore, class actions
are merely referenced without further procedural analysis.
181 In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 634 (3d Cir. 2017)
(citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)).
182 This approach is distinguished from the general class action bar against achieving standing
through harms to unnamed plaintiffs, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 357 (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)), because the “piggybacking” plaintiff would show
a risk of future harm injury through the actual identity theft or fraud of other victims of the same
data breach. Cf. id. at 395–96 (Souter, J., dissenting in part) (Once the named class action plain-
tiff’s standing fails mid-litigation, “even then the question is not whether suit can proceed on the
standing of some unnamed members of the class, but whether ‘the named representative [can
continue] to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”’” (quoting Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 403 (1975))).
183 See Brian Charles Lea, The Merits of Third-Party Standing, 24 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 277, 299–302 (2015) (providing a brief overview of jus tertii’s origin and application
over time).
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party.184 But like all judicial fabrications, that prohibition is both malleable and with
gaping exception, exemplified by jus tertii.185
Modern jus tertii doctrine allows a third party to vindicate the rights of an injured
party when that third party shares a close relationship to the victim and the victim
faces some obstacle to redressing that injury him- or herself.186 The “piggybacking”
approach advanced here would borrow the first prong from jus tertii doctrine and
flip the second prong on its head. The third party under this framework will have
still suffered some clear injury—an identity theft or fraud—and the “piggybacker”
must sufficiently prove that injury with respect to the third party—i.e., the “piggy-
backer” would simply prove the “unnamed” third party suffered the injury. However,
the nexus between the third party and the “piggybacker” need only exist to the extent
that both individuals were victims of the same breach. In effect, the “piggybacker”
shows a substantial risk of fraud or identity theft through the actual fraud or identity
theft of a victim of the same data breach instance—a type of injury that would be
recognized by each of the split circuits.187
The “piggybacking” approach would shrink the data breach plaintiff’s sword
considerably (compared to the “breach alone” approach). But its origins in both the
class action device and jus tertii theory open this approach to vast criticism.188 Jus
tertii is not only an exception to standing but an exceedingly narrow exception.189
Similarly, class actions require a host of hoops to jump through for certification and
have largely fallen out of favor with courts.190 Despite providing a more generous
shield to the courts (and potential data breach litigation defendants alike), this
approach would likely remain nonviable.
C. “Tiered Sensitivity” Approach
Recognizing the potentially radical effect of the “piggybacking” framework and
the broad (and, therefore, potentially too plaintiff-friendly) “breach alone” framework,
184 See id. at 296.
185 See id. at 298 (noting jus tertii as a major exception to prudential standing).
186 Id. at 300–01 (further noting the Court’s relaxed application of both jus tertii prongs).
187 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 772 (8th Cir. 2017); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s
China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016). But see Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,
689 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2017). In Whalen, the court denied injury in fact based on, among
other theories, fraudulent purchases because the plaintiff had not been asked to pay for any
of the false charges. Id. However, the court erred in its ruling based on a misunderstanding
of modern identity theft. See supra Section III.B.
188 See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking
the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 406–17 (2014) (overviewing both positive
and negative critiques of the class device).
189 See 16 C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 167 (2020).
190 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731
(2013).
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this Note recommends an approach that splits the differences in the two concepts to
avoid holstering litigants’ swords or confiscating the judiciary’s shield entirely. Most
of the circuits analyzed in this Note recognize the highly sensitive nature of the data
that litigants address in their breach litigation.191 Some courts go further to identify
which types of data are worthy of more rigid scrutiny when exposed to third party
theft by breach defendants.192
Similarly, common sense tells us that a telephone number is not as intrinsically
linked to the individual as is a single Social Security number assigned throughout the
lifetime of the individual.193 Therefore, a compromise approach in data breach litigation
must account for tiers of data sensitivity, analyzed more severely as sensitivity in-
creases. This approach would parallel the Court’s existing standards of review in
Equal Protection Clause inquiries,194 recognizing that some classes of data may
require a rebuttable presumption of imminent identity theft or fraud,195 while others
ask more of plaintiffs to prove the same.196
The most critical, intrinsic data types, for example, vital health records and Social
Security numbers,197 would receive “strict scrutiny,” or the highest level sensitivity
analysis.198 In this tier, because the breached data has such value to hackers even in
191 See, e.g., Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 90–91; Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 627–28
(D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018); In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 770–71.
192 See, e.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1027–29 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 1373 (2019); In re SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 770–71.
193 See Do You Need a New Social Security Number?, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2012),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0248-do-you-need-new-social-security-number [https://
perma.cc/CK6Y-LPZE] (outlining extreme, rare examples for requesting a new Social Secur-
ity number).
194 See Eric Heinze, The Logic of Standards of Review in Constitutional Cases: A Deontic
Analysis, 28 VT. L. REV. 121, 129 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has adopted three general stan-
dards of review in constitutional cases: ‘strict scrutiny,’ ‘[intermediate] scrutiny,’ and ‘rational
basis review.’”).
195 See 16B C.J.S.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1275 (2020) (defining the test for strict scrutiny).
196 See id. §§ 1278–79 (defining the tests for intermediate scrutiny and rational basis).
197 See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S.
Ct. 981 (2018).
198 See 16B C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1275. When discussing the importance of
protecting PII, the federal government recognized that some data, including Social Security
numbers, “are particularly sensitive and may alone present an increased risk of harm to the
individual.” OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 77, at 22. Indeed, the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) delineates two tiers of PII, where Sensitive PII (SPII) carries strict
handling protocols due to its “increased risk to an individual if the data are compromised.”
See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HANDBOOK FOR SAFEGUARDING SENSITIVE PERSON-
ALLY IDENTIFIABLEINFORMATION 3–6 (2012), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publi
cations/Handbook%20for%20Safeguarding%20Sensitive%20PII_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/XZ4A-F668]. DHS’s SPII categories include both stand-alone data, like Social Security num-
bers, and data that becomes sensitive when paired with general PII—i.e., “medical information”
paired with an email address. Id. at 5.
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isolation,199 the presumption would be that hackers will imminently harm the plaintiff,
and the burden would fall to the defendant to prove substantial non-imminence or
some other substantially countervailing affirmative defense—loosely related to com-
pelling interest and narrow fit.200
Slightly less sensitive but still significant data, for example, financial information,
would receive “intermediate scrutiny.”201 In this tier, the same presumption of imminent
threat of future harm would still exist, but the defense need only prove by a prepon-
derance of facts that the threat is not imminent or that it has a countervailing reason
to be held harmless—paralleling the important government objective requirement.202
The least sensitive data, for example, telephone numbers and email addresses,
would be analyzed similarly to the “rational basis test,” or the lowest level of scru-
tiny.203 In this tier, the presumption of imminent future harm would be stricken
because the types of data within this tier would not fall within a “suspect class” due
to its general, isolated lack of value to hackers.204 Defendants would therefore only
have to prove non-imminence (or some other attack on injury in fact) if the plaintiffs
could rebut the lack of presumption—essentially the “presumption” rests with the
defendant, correlating to a rational basis.205
This framework would also lend itself to modification if—and more likely
when206—a data breach encompasses multiple types of data across the scrutiny tiers
(e.g., both telephone and Social Security numbers). A court would have three options
to proceed: (1) analyze each claim under its appropriate tier, likely, for example, in-
validating the rational basis data claims and allowing suit for the strict scrutiny data;
(2) developing additional scrutiny tiers to accommodate the blended tier claims; or (3)
analyzing the combination of data loss across tiers as simply more severe than data lost
within a tier. This Note recommends the third option because, as the federal government
has noted, some information may alone not be utilized for identity theft, but in
combination with other data, a data breach victim can more easily become the victim
of identity theft.207
Many of the same vulnerabilities of the “breach alone” and “piggybacking” ap-
proaches apply to the “tiered sensitivity” approach. However, the “tiered sensitivity”
approach presents a neat compromise position that seems to answer most prior
criticisms.208 In particular, tiering data by level of intrinsic value to the victim affords
199 See Weisbaum, supra note 9.
200 See 16B C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1275.
201 See id. § 1278.
202 See id.
203 See id. § 1279.
204 See id. §§ 1275, 78–79; see also Weisbaum, supra note 9.
205 See 16B C.J.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1279.
206 See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138
S. Ct. 981 (2018) (where the breached data included, inter alia, “email addresses, social security
numbers, and credit card information”).
207 See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 77, at 8, 22.
208 See supra notes 168–78, 185–87 and accompanying text.
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the most fairness to both plaintiffs and defendants, because the most vulnerable plain-
tiffs have the highest chance to be vindicated at trial, but not every data breach de-
fendant will have to expend resources for the same given particular criteria. In short,
the “tiered sensitivity” approach recognizes the reality and value of what is lost in data
breaches, but balances victims’ swords against the necessity of shielding both defen-
dants and courts from burdensome litigation over information unlikely to lead to harm.
V. SOCIETY IS MOVING TOWARDS DATA PROTECTION,
AND THE COURT MUST FOLLOW SUIT
A. Non-Congressional Legislative Models Buttress the “Tiered Sensitivity” Model
Though Congress has yet failed to enact a broad, unified reform for data breach
remediation, state and international legislatures have recently trended towards large-
scale data protection regulations.209 Justice Brandeis’s laboratories of democracy
idea210 supports the argument that state and comparable foreign sovereigns serve as
a social marker to inform and direct a federal framework of data protection, if not
in Congress, then through the judiciary.
1. The General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR)
In 2016, the European Union adopted the GDPR as a vast data protection frame-
work for its citizens.211 The GDPR instills individuals with “fundamental” digital
rights,212 including a right of remedy against any “controller” or “processor” who fails
to abide by its provisions.213 One example GDPR provision requires notification to
an individual when a controller or processor suffers a data breach.214 Two important
considerations flow from this provision.
209 See generally Data Protection Law: An Overview, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 25, 2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45631.pdf [https://perma.cc/2D6Y-2DHR] (providing a summary
of existing legislation in state, federal, and international jurisdictions).
210 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
211 See generally Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter EU GDPR],
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679 [https://
perma.cc/4MDA-YL3J].
212 See id. at L 119/32, art. 1; see also id. at L 119/1 (“The protection . . . of personal data
is a fundamental right.”).
213 Id. at L 119/81, art. 82; see id. at L 119/33, art. 4, recitals 7–8 (defining “controller”
and “processor” broadly).
214 See id. at L 119/52–53, art. 34; see also id. at L 119/17, recitals 86–88.
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First, requiring data handlers to inform affected individuals of a data breach
lends support to the “breach alone” and “tiered sensitivity” approaches.215 Forcing
disclosure to victims of a data breach implies that harm to the individual occurs at
the moment of breach, not upon either a risk of potential harm or actual fraud or
identity theft.216
Second, and perhaps most instructively, the GDPR also scales the notification
requirement for handlers to the sensitivity of the stolen information and the severity
of the breach.217 Essentially, if the breached data is highly sensitive or affects the
“rights and freedoms” of victims, the notification must be near-immediate, unless
countervailing interests would suggest otherwise.218 The GDPR’s minimal scaling
for requiring notification to affected data breach victims is a useful jumping off
point for the Court to implement the “tiered sensitivity” framework, since it mirrors
many of the attributes of the approach.
2. State-Level Approaches to Data Protection
In the face of congressional silence, many states have instituted frameworks of
varying degree and scope to jumpstart the process of protecting users’ data. The
most robust of these is the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which imposes
security and notification requirements on businesses meeting certain criteria.219 Other
states have waded and continue to wade into the waters of data privacy legislation,
each with nuanced measures to illicit stronger data privacy considerations from both
the custodians of data and the individual citizens (who may be potential litigants in
data breach actions).220
215 Supra Part III & Section IV.A (“breach alone”); Section IV.C (“tiered sensitivity”).
216 See EU GDPR, supra note 211, at L 119/17, recitals 86–88.
217 See id. at L 119/52–53, art. 34; see also id. at L 119/17, recitals 86–88.
218 See id. at L 119/52–53, art. 34; see also id. at L 119/17, recitals 86–88.
219 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020). In the 2020 election, California voters
passed the California Privacy Rights Act, which will expand and amend the CCPA, including
its notification requirements. See Stacey Gray, Katelyn Ringrose, Polly Sanderson & Veronica
Alex, California’s Prop 24, the “California Privacy Rights Act,” Passed. What’s Next?, FUTURE
PRIV.F., https://fpf.org/blog/californias-prop-24-the-california-privacy-rights-act-passed-whats
-next/ [https://perma.cc/C7TK-L4SA] (Dec. 17, 2020); see also Else Feikje van der Berg,
“CCPA 2.0” Could Significantly Expand the CCPA, DATAWALLET (June 21, 2020, 10:00 PM),
https://datawallet.com/blog/ccpa-2-0-could-significantly-expand-the-ccpa [https://perma.cc
/7F97-R6BR] (providing an overview of the CPRA’s key provisions).
220 For a summary of recently enacted or pending data privacy legislation, see Sarah Rippy,
US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS., https://iapp
.org/resources/article/state-comparison-table/ [https://perma.cc/45Q2-PQ7N] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2021). The document is regularly updated to reflect legislative fluctuations.
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Though it is promising that states have taken it upon themselves to introduce pro-
tective measures where the federal government has failed, the lack of uniformity across
state lines is indicative of why the Court’s resolution of the circuit split would be a wel-
come, and necessary, addition to data users’ arsenal to recover for data breach losses.
Importantly, in support of a cross-continental agreement on data protection standards,
state legislation generally shares commonality with the GDPR with respect to notice re-
quirements and private rights of action for victims of data breaches.221 Therefore, do-
mestic jurisdictions appear to be encouraging a unified front for protecting data breach
victims, leaving open the opportunity for the Court to adopt a data breach-specific
injury in fact constitutional standing framework as a complement to state efforts.
a. California
The CCPA implemented a framework of data protection for California citizens.222
The CCPA requires businesses meeting certain criteria223 to take “reasonable security
procedures” to protect consumer data.224 For individuals, the CCPA establishes a
private right of action against qualifying businesses upon “unauthorized access and
exfiltration, theft, or disclosure” of data.225 Despite its scope to only California busi-
nesses and citizens, the CCPA is undoubtedly the most far-reaching state-level
consumer-protective legislation in the United States to date.226
b. Nevada & Maine
Nevada’s personal information protection framework includes for Nevada citi-
zens a data breach notification provision.227 However, it does not include a private
right of action for typically affected individual victims.228 Interestingly, the Nevada
221 See, e.g., CAL. CIV.CODE § 1798.150; An Act Relative to the Collection of Personal Infor-
mation by Business, H.B. 1680, 2020 Sess. (N.H. 2020).
222 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100.
223 Id. § 1798.140 (defining “business” as any for-profit company operating in California that
(1) has $25 million in gross annual revenue; (2) alone or in combination buys, sells, or shares
personal data of 50,000 or more people; or (3) gets over half of its revenue from selling
consumer data).
224 Id. § 1798.150.
225 Id. For a comparison of the CCPA to the GDPR, see America’s GDPR? Seven Work-
streams to Implement California’s Consumer Privacy Act, PWC (2018), https://www.pwc.com
/us/en/services/consulting/assets/pwc-americas-gdpr-seven-workstreams.pdf [https://perma
.cc/UW7B-CMRM].
226 See Greg Bensinger, So Far, Under California’s New Privacy Law, Firms Are Disclosing
Too Little Data—Or Far Too Much, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2020, 7:44 PM), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/technology/2020/01/21/ccpa-transparency/ [https://perma.cc/P57N-42UC]
(“The CCPA is considered the nation’s most far-reaching online privacy law and a potential
model for other states.”).
227 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.220 (West 2006).
228 See generally id. §§ 603A.300–360.
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notification requirement looks similar to the GDPR requirement, demanding an
immediate notification to affected individuals unless there are countervailing
interests to delay the notification.229
Maine’s legislation is by far the least protective of the three state-enacted frame-
works presented.230 For Maine citizens, it includes neither a private right of action
nor a breach notification provision.231 The statute is directed towards internet service
providers (ISPs)232 and generally only prohibits the types of data ISPs can collect and
use;233 however, ISPs are required to implement protective measures for that data to pre-
vent unauthorized access.234 Though the least protective of consumers overall, the
Maine legislation is a useful indicator that states are not only trending toward arm-
ing potential data breach plaintiffs, but actually enacting laws to put the swords in
their hands.
c. Selected Proposed Legislation in Other States
Many states are currently considering legislation that would protect individuals’
data to some degree.235 In New York and South Carolina, laws would require
notification of a data breach to affected consumers.236 In Illinois, Maryland, New
Hampshire, New York, and South Carolina, proposed legislation provides a private
right of action to the individuals affected by a data breach.237 Illinois, Iowa, and
Minnesota also have pending laws that would require routine risk assessments, but
obviously this would be a much narrower protection than breach notifications or
rights of action.238 Finally, a number of states have moved proposed legislation to
a task force to study this area in greater detail, effectively preserving the potential
for widespread data protection.239
229 See id. § 603A.220.
230 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 9301 (West 2020).
231 See id.
232 Id. § 9301(1)(D).
233 See generally id. § 9301.
234 See id. § 9301(5).
235 See Rippy, supra note 220.
236 See S.B. 5642, State Assemb., 2019–20 Sess. (N.Y. 2019); H.B. 4812, 123d Gen.
Assemb., 2019–2020 Sess. (S.C. 2019) (referring only to collected biometric data).
237 See H.B. 5603, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2019 & 2020 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2020); S.B. 2330,
101st Gen. Assemb., 2019 & 2020 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2020); H.B. 1656, 2020 Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020); H.B. 1680, Gen. Court, 2020 Sess. (N.H. 2020); N.Y. S.B. 5642; S.C.
H.B. 4812.
238 See Ill. S.B. 2330; S.B. 2263, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2019 & 2020 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); S.
File 2351, 88th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2020) (as amended by S-5084 on Mar. 11,
2020); H. File 3936, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2020).
239 Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Texas all fall into
this category. See Rippy, supra note 220.
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B. The Court Must Act Despite Congressional Inaction
It is ultimately within the courts’ purview to act as an engine of social change
when legislatures fail to perform the same function.240 And the importance of
heightened security for at least certain tiers of personal data cannot be overstated.
Some data, like Social Security numbers or medical records, cannot be cancelled
(like the cancelled credit card the Second Circuit relied on to deny standing in
Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc.241); therefore, risk of identity theft when this type
of data is stolen may continue on forever.242 Those entities entrusted with sensitive
personal data must be held to rigorous standards to encourage the highest possible
safety standards and prevent the theft of data which could severely, and perpetually,
burden victims of data breaches.
Illustrative of why the Court must act if Congress declines to legislate is the
Third Circuit’s holding in Horizon Healthcare.243 After laptops containing “unen-
crypted” sensitive data, including in some cases health history and Social Security
numbers, were stolen from defendant’s premises, affected plaintiffs filed suit.244 The
Third Circuit granted standing to the plaintiffs under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA).245 The court held that rather than clarifying the injury in fact requirement,
Spokeo emphasized Congress’s power to create standing, which guided the Horizon
Healthcare court’s rationale.246 The court noted that without passage of the FCRA,
the instant plaintiffs would otherwise have no opportunity to redress their injuries.247
To be sure, the court did not foreclose the idea that a breach by itself can tend to
240 See Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Liability for Data Injuries, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV.
295, 314 (“Historically, courts have occasionally participated in social changes by modernizing
the law when legislatures have been slow to respond to emerging trends.”); see also Heather K.
Gerken, The Supreme Court Is a Partner in Transformation, Not the Sole Agent, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2015, 2:20 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/07/06/is-the-supreme
-court-too-powerful/the-supreme-court-is-a-partner-in-transformation-not-the-sole-agent
[https://perma.cc/AGJ4-RAN2] (noting that with respect to the social groundswell leading
to United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013), “the courts haven’t been in the lead in effect-
ing change, but they have been an integral part of the process of change”).
241 689 F. App’x 89, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2017).
242 Unfortunately, “forever” is not an exaggeration. See Kirchheimer, supra note 158.
243 See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir.
2017).
244 Id. at 630–31.
245 See id. at 634–35.
246 See id. at 638–41.
247 See id. at 638–40; see also id. at 643 (Shwartz, J., concurring in the judgment) (writing
separately to make clear that the plaintiffs’ alternative theory of liability through a risk of future
harm would have been unavailing had the court found it necessary to rule beyond the base-
line FCRA unauthorized disclosure theory).
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show an injury in fact,248 but the court’s analysis depended upon an existent federal
statute.249
Horizon Healthcare perfectly encapsulates the dangerous confusion the Court is
well-positioned to quell. Without a congressional framework for data breach litigation,
litigants are left with piecemeal federal opportunities—by statute or court—to remedy
likely forthcoming losses from stolen data, begetting the circuit split, and with some,
potentially many, victims falling through the cracks in the current patchwork system.
CONCLUSION
The consequences of data breaches are too steep for the ultimate victims, data
breach litigation plaintiffs, to suffer without proper opportunity for recourse. Because
the current landscape of standing in data breach litigation continues to vacillate,
although recently trending towards plaintiff-victims, the Court must revisit its
approach to standing for data breach cases, regardless of whether Congress presents
the Court an opportunity to do so through federal overhaul legislation.
The current circuit split over Article III standing in data breach litigation carries
the potential for resolution without upheaval. This Note advances three potential
solutions, any one of which would significantly ease the encumbrances on data breach
victims. But the “tiered sensitivity” approach provides substantial incentive for each
interested faction to accept the change without controversy: a heavy enough sword
for plaintiffs to recoup most losses, fairness for defendants to avoid permanent
liability in all cases, and an adequate shield for courts to maintain jurisdiction over
truly justiciable cases. Because the Court’s own jurisprudence over the past half-
century supports revisiting and reshaping the standing doctrine morass, the Court
should follow the example of legislatures at home and abroad to step in and effect
a necessary social protection for data breach plaintiffs in pursuit of lawful recovery.
248 But see id. at 643–44. Similar to the Fourth Circuit in Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262,
274–75 (4th Cir. 2017), Judge Shwartz would require a thief to know what the laptop contained
and have targeted it specifically to exploit that information. Neither Judge Shwartz’s concurrence
nor the majority opinion discuss the proper result in a classic breach scenario (i.e., hackers pene-
trating a digital firewall). See generally Horizon Healthcare, 846 F.3d at 625–44.
249 Id. at 639.
